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Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties: An
Analysis of the Foreign Corporation's Exemption
from United States Labor Standards
I. INTRODUCTION
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties, like other
treaties, create unique and difficult problems for the courts when at-
tempting to reconcile their provisions with conflicting federal legisla-
tion. When signed by the President of the United States, an FCN
treaty becomes part of the domestic law of this country without the
necessity of further legislative action.' Like federal legislation, trea-
ties become part of the "supreme Law of the Land ...."2 This com-
ment will discuss article VIII(1), as worded in the Korean and
Japanese FCN treaties and its relation to various federal civil rights
and labor regulations.S
Article VIII(1) of the Japanese FCN Treaty states in relevant part
that "[n]ationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to
engage, within the territories of the other Party .... executive per-
sonnel .. .of their choice.' 4 The "of their choice" language, read in
its broadest light, appears to exempt foreign corporations from
United States labor and civil rights standards with regard to the hir-
ing and firing of executive personnel. However, both courts and com-
mentators have overlooked the plain meaning of article VIII to avoid
granting such a broad exemption to foreign corporations claiming
1. See, e.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (involving a Japa-
nese citizen, a pawnbroker, who challenged a city ordinance allowing only United
States citizens to engage in his line of business on grounds that it conflicted with the
FCN treaty with Japan).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 7, 1957, United
States-Republic of Korea, art. VIII(l), 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2223, T.I.A.S. No. 3947 [hereinaf-
ter ROK Treaty]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953,
United States-Japan, art. VIII(l), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter
Japanese Treaty]. Other FCN treaties containing similar employment provisions are
those with Republic of China, Italy, Uruguay, Ireland, Colombia, Ethiopia, Israel, Den-
mark, Federal Republic of Germany, Nicaragua, Netherlands, and Pakistan. See 1
I.L.M. 91, 92-94 (1962) (treaties with Uruguay and Colombia signed but not in force).
4. Japanese Treaty, supra note 3, at 2070. As noted above, this is the identical
language found in the Korean provision. See ROK Treaty, supra note 3, at 2223.
protection under article VIII.5
While the determination of the scope of article VIII appears pri-
marily to involve the application of established doctrines of treaty in-
terpretation, two caveats are of note. First, the doctrines of treaty
interpretation are unclear regarding federal legislative preemption of
prior conflicting treaty provisions. Second, the primary goal of FCN
treaties-encouraging foreign investment--often runs contrary to the
undoubtedly significant goals pursued by United States civil rights
and labor laws.
Article VIII was negotiated and agreed upon prior to two signifi-
cant social and economic changes occurring in the United States. The
first event was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 which
raises the question of whether an international agreement is so elas-
tic as to be subjected to various interpretations based upon fluctua-
tions in the United States social climate. The second event was the
tremendous growth in foreign investment (especially Pacific Rim in-
vestment), which was largely unforeseen by the United States negoti-
ators. At the time the treaty was signed, the United States might
have been willing to concede a narrow but complete exemption from
United States laws with regard to the engagement of executive per-
sonnel. However, were it foreseeable that United States branches of
foreign corporations would today be employing a vast number of
American citizens, such a concession seems less likely. Do such un-
anticipated events warrant a unilateral revision (i.e., ignoring the
plain meaning of the words "of their choice") of a bilateral interna-
tional agreement?
The bilateral nature of the treaties must also be recognized.
Although the issue centers on a foreign corporation's exemption
from American legal standards, it must not be forgotten that United
States corporations are given the same benefit in the signatory's
country. Therefore, when attempting to understand the underlying
intent of article VIII, it is critical to remember that the United States
negotiated on behalf of its own corporations to achieve the most
favorable investment climate possible in the foreign nation.
Considering the tremendous economic bargaining power the
United States maintained over the various FCN nations when the
treaties were enacted, it becomes clear that the relative advantage of
5. See, e.g., Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Note, Japanese Companies on United
States Soil Treaty Privileges vs. Title VII Restraints, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 377 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Japanese Companies]; Note, Commercial Treaties
and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 947 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Japanese Employers].
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253, 253-66 (1964)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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exempting United States executives' from foreign labor standards
greatly outweighed any concession given in return. Thus, while ad-
vantageous to impose American labor standards on a foreign corpora-
tion's ability to engage executive personnel, it is foolish to assume
that this unilateral revision of article VIII would go unreciprocated.
In turn, this could subject United States corporations to a wide array
of foreign standards which might effectively eliminate United States
control over its foreign subsidiaries.
Given this complex backdrop, it comes as no surprise that the case
law defining article VIII has resulted in inconsistent interpretations.
Two federal appellate court cases providing the foundation for this
divergence of views are Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.7
and Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.8
In Sumitomo, the Second Circuit concluded that article VIII does
not grant foreign corporations a "license to violate American laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment." 9 The court reasoned that
article VIII was included in the treaty in response to the laws of "a
number of American states and many foreign countries [which] se-
verely restricted the employment of noncitizens within their bounda-
ries."10 The court felt article VIII "was primarily intended to exempt
companies operating abroad from local legislation restricting the em-
ployment of noncitizens."" Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not
"preclude the company from employing Japanese nationals"12 due to
the Act's bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception,' 3
which grants foreign corporations the ability to engage executives of
7. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court in Sumitomo avoided interpreting the scope of article VIII
and its relation to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by concluding that a foreign subsid-
iary, incorporated in the United States, was not a company of Japan and was therefore
not entitled to FCN treaty protections. 457 U.S. at 183.
8. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
9. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 558. In Sumitomo, female secretarial employees
brought a class action suit against a Japanese corporation complaining of Sumitomo's
hiring practice regarding management level positions open only to male Japanese na-
tionals. Id. at 553.
10. Id. at 559 (quoting Note, Japanese Employers, supra note 5, at 952-53 & n.28).
11. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 559.
12. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
provides that: "[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees .... on the basis of... national origin in those certain
instances where.., national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ...." Id.
their choice providing certain criteria are met.1 4
The Fifth Circuit in Itoh noted, however, that the primary purpose
of FCN treaties was "to provide a stable environment for private in-
ternational investment."1 5 The court held that Sumitomo incorrectly
labeled article VIII as a clause which should only be "read to grant
national treatment."16 In an extensive analysis regarding the rights
to be accorded various treaty provisions,' 7 the court found article
VIII to be a noncontingent provision providing for "absolute rules"
unrelated to national treatment concerns.' 8 These absolute rules
permit foreign nationals to control their overseas investments.' 9 Itoh
concluded that "[c]onsidering the Treaty as a whole, the only reason-
able interpretation is that article VIII(1) means exactly what it says:
Companies have a right to decide which executives and technicians
will manage their investment in the host country, without regard to
host country laws."20
This comment suggests that the proper interpretation of article
VIII falls somewhere between the two polarities represented by
Sumitomo and Itoh. Certainly, the words "of their choice" can rea-
sonably be read to grant a complete exemption from the host coun-
tries' labor standards as illustrated by the Itoh case. Such an
interpretation, however, effectively grants foreign corporations the
right to engage executive personnel in a manner that is not only un-
necessary, but also was not bargained for by the treaties' signatories.
14. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 559. The court recognized that the BFOQ exception "is
to be construed narrowly," but went on to hold that:
[A]s applied to a Japanese company enjoying rights under Article VIII of the
Treaty it [the BFOQ exception] must be construed in a manner that will give
due weight to the Treaty rights and unique requirements of a Japanese com-
pany doing business in the United States, including such factors as a person's
(1) Japanese linguistic and cultural skills, (2) knowledge of Japanese products,
markets, customs, and business practices, (3) familiarity with the personnel
and workings of the principal or parent enterprise in Japan, and (4) accepta-
bility to those persons with whom the company or branch does business.
Id. The court, however, failed to address the fact that subjecting foreign corporations
to Title VII resulted in a case by case evaluation of their employment practices which
was not the intention of the treaties' signatories. Further, while the BFOQ exception
provides some minimal protection from Title VII, it does absolutely nothing for a cor-
poration subjected to other United States labor laws (e.g., The Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1938)).
15. Itoh, 643 F.2d at 359.
16. Id. at 360.
17. In determining what standards are to be accorded various treaty provisions,
the court relied extensively on FCN authority Herman Walker. Id. at 357. "A State
Department cable notes that Mr. Walker formulated the modern concept of FCN trea-
ties and negotiated many treaties on behalf of the United States." Id. at 357 n.2.
Walker recognized three possible standards to be applied to various treaty provisions,
two contingent and one noncontingent standard. See Walker, Modern Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805, 811 (1958).
18. Itoh, 643 F.2d at 360.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 361.
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The purposes behind article VIII indicate that the parties to the
treaties were primarily concerned with maintaining control over
their foreign investments.21 In order to maintain this control, the
parties were concerned only with protecting their ability to engage
their own citizens in executive positions without regard to the host
country's labor standards. For example, there is no indication or ba-
sis for inferring that the treaties were intended to allow a foreign
corporation to hire United States children in violation of child labor
laws, or to hire white United States citizens over black United States
citizens in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Thus, an in-
terpretation that article VIII provides a complete exemption from all
host country labor laws appears to be overly broad.
Conversely, the Sumitomo approach also appears erroneous. Sub-
jecting foreign corporations protected by FCN treaties to all United
States labor standards not only renders article VIII entirely meaning-
less,22 but is also contrary to the primary purpose of FCN treaties,
which is to encourage investment.
This comment's proposal for interpreting article VIII's "of their
choice" language grants a complete exemption from the host coun-
try's labor laws only when a foreign corporation is attempting to en-
gage its own citizens in executive positions. This approach does not
grant foreign corporations permission to violate United States labor
laws under any other circumstances. Such an interpretation is con-
sistent with the plain meaning of article VIII, the intent of the par-
ties to the treaties, as well as the scope of United States labor and
civil rights standards. In support of this proposition, it is necessary to
explore the language of the treaty, the intent of its signatories, and
the doctrines of treaty interpretation.
II. THE LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE VIII
To interpret the meaning of article VIII, two key phrases require
investigation. Article VIII(1) states: "Nationals and companies of
either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of
the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive
personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice."23
The meaning of the word "engage" is significant because often a la-
bor discrimination action arises after the foreign corporation hds ter-
21. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
22. See Itoh, 643 F.2d at 362.
23. See Japanese Treaty, supra note 3, art. VIII(l), at 2070 (emphasis added).
minated a United States citizen and replaced him with a citizen of its
own country.24 The question then becomes whether the right to "en-
gage" also includes the right to terminate employment. 25 It seems
consistent with the interests associated with article VIII to conclude
that such a right exists.
The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he power of removal is inci-
dent to the power of appointment .... ,,26 This is consistent with the
Black's Law Dictionary definition of "engage" which provides that
the word "imports more than a single transaction." 27 Further, since
one of article VIII's primary purposes is to ensure that foreign invest-
ment remains in the investor's control,28 it would be anomalous to
conclude that the right to engage does not include the right to termi-
nate. Otherwise, a foreign corporation may be forced to retain an un-
necessary employee in a control position due solely to the laws of the
host country. This is exactly the situation article VIII was designed
to protect.
Furthermore, had the parties intended to limit the scope of article
VIII to hiring but not firing, they could have expressly stated such
intent. Any other interpretation will discourage foreign firms from
hiring local residents, since the only way to avoid the risk of liability
under local laws would be refusing to hire them in the first place.
Thus, it is consistent with the objectives of article VIII to include the
right to terminate within the definition of the right to engage.29
The second phrase needing definition is the "of their choice" lan-
guage found in article VIII. A fundamental principle of treaty con-
struction specifies that "[t]he clear import of treaty language controls
unless 'application of the words of the treaty according to their obvi-
24. See, e.g., Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984) (Greek air-
line fired American employee who filed suit alleging discrimination based on age and
national origin); MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (MacNamara, a 57-year-old American citizen replaced by a 42-year-old
Korean citizen, filed suit alleging a Title VII violation).
25. Treaty provisions should be interpreted with a special sensitivity to the words
actually chosen by the parties. This is especially true with regard to the Japanese and
Korean treaties because the two documents were written in two languages between
people of different countries who did not even share a common linguistic heritage.
26. Myers v. United States, 27.2 U.S. 52, 122 (1926) (postmaster appointed by the
President to a four-year term brought suit for past salary after being terminated by an
order of the Postmaster General).
27. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 622 (4th ed. 1957) (citing Head v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 43 F.2d 517, 519 (10th Cir. 1930)).
28. Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 234 (1956); see also inkfra notes
130-132 and accompanying text.
29. Though Wickes and MacNamara had the opportunity to directly address this
issue, they were silent on the matter; their silence can be interpreted as an implied
acceptance of this view. See Linskey v. Heidelberg, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1686 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (impliedly assuming "engage" includes the right to terminate in
Title VII conflict involving FCN provision similar to article VIII).
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ous meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expecta-
tions of its signatories.' "30 The obvious meaning of the words "of
their choice" lends support to the Fifth Circuit's view in Itoh that ar-
ticle VIII exempts foreign corporations from any law limiting their
ability to control their executive personnel.3 1 However, whether the
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or ex-
pectations of the signatories requires a deeper look into the underly-
ing policies and the general intent of article VIII.
III. THE INTENT OF THE SIGNATORIES
The Sumitomo court based its holding that article VIII(1) does not
exclude foreign corporations from United States labor standards on
the proposition that the signatories' intent was to exempt foreign cor-
porations from percentile restrictions imposed by the host country on
employment of noncitizens. 32 Based on this somewhat narrow view
of the provision's intent, the court concluded that the foreign corpo-
ration was subject to Title VII restrictions since there was no percen-
tile restriction on the corporation's ability to hire their own citizens,
especially in light of the court's expanded interpretation of the
BFOQ exception.33
However, the intent mentioned in Sumitomo appears to be only
one of many reasons behind the inclusion of article VIII in the FCN
treaties. As the court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.34 noted, "[t]he Treaty with Japan was 'part of a pro-
gram to develop a series of modern commercial treaties whose gen-
eral aim is to assure protection for American citizens and American
interests in foreign countries.'"35 The fact that these interests in-
cluded more than just immunity from percentile restrictions on the
hiring of noncitizens is reinforced by the legislative histories of the
30. Sumitomo, 4§7 U.S. at 180 (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54
(1963)).
31. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. "Choice implies the chance,
right, or power to choose, usually by the free exercise of one's judgment .... WEB-
STER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 250 (2d ed. 1972).
32. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 559.
33. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
34. 494 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Pa. 1980) An American manufacturer brought suit
against a branch office of a Japanese corporation claiming violation of The Antidump-
ing Act of 1916. Id. at 1264. The court held that an FCN treaty did not impliedly re-
peal the statute. I& at 1268.
35. Id. at 1267. (citing S. REP. No. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953)).
treaties. Prior to the ratification of the Japanese treaty, Harold Lin-
der, Deputy Assistant of State for Economic Affairs testified that:
Perhaps the most important respect in which the current treaties differ from
those of the twenties and thirties is in the greatly increased emphasis on the
encouragement of American private investment abroad, by the expansion and
strengthening of provisions relating to the protection of the investor and his
interests. This development, of course, reflects the process of continuous ad-
justment to the needs and conditions of the era in which negotiation takes
place. The United States came out of the war with a greatly expanded indus-
trial machine and, alone among the major nations of the world, with a surplus
of private capital available for export. To encourage the investment of this
capital in the production of goods and services abroad was a matter of impor-
tance to our domestic economy and to economic development and world pros-
perity generally.3
6
Other comments during the ratification process also support the
conclusion that the overriding purpose of the FCN treaties was to en-
courage American businesses, especially corporations, to develop for-
eign branch and subsidiary operations. 37  Although percentile
restrictions were one concern, it would be unrealistic to assume that
the signatories were not also concerned about other types of legisla-
tion which would equally impair the ability to control their invest-
ment through executive hiring practices.
Sumitomo's reliance on the premise that article VIII was a reaction
to percentile restrictions stemmed from an article by FCN authority,
Herman Walker. 38 Yet, even the provision from Walker's article
cited to in the court's opinion3 9 shows that Walker had no intent to
limit article VIII to percentile restrictions. He described article VIII
as follows: "[M]anagement is assured freedom of choice in the engag-
ing of essential executive and technical employees in general, regard-
less of their nationality, without legal interference from 'percentile'
restrictions and the like . -40 The use of the phrase "and the like"
indicates that Walker felt the United States was concerned with
more than just percentile restrictions. Article VIII was apparently
directed toward any domestic employment statute which would in-
36. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of this Committee on Foreign Relations of the
United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952).
37. During hearings on five proposed FCN treaties in 1953, the Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs testified:
Of special concern to investors are such assurances as those regarding rights
to engage in extensive fields of business activity upon as favorable terms as
the nationals of the country, the right of the owner to manage his own affairs
and employ personnel of his choice, the right to fair treatment if his enter-
prise is in competition with state controlled enterprise, the right to just com-
pensation if his property is nationalized, and reasonable opportunity to
repatriate earnings and capital.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. 203 (1953) [hereinafter 1953 Hearings].
38. Walker, supra note 28.
39. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 181 n.6.
40. Walker, supra note 28, at 234 (emphasis added).
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terfere with the management and control of a foreign branch
operation.
However, just as the commentary and legislative history of FCN
treaties seems to indicate that article VIII was drafted to provide an
exemption from all domestic labor laws, there is also authority to
suggest that this exemption was intended to be available only in cer-
tain situations. Legislative history, though sparse, does indicate that
the exemption was intended to apply only when a foreign corporation
is attempting to engage one of its own citizens. For example, regard-
ing the Japanese treaty, a congressional report described article VIII
as only giving foreign employers the right to engage executive per-
sonnel "regardless of nationality."41 Further, the concern over per-
centile regulations, though not necessarily the sole intent behind
article VIII, does lend support to the conclusion that article VIII was
drafted to protect the placement of only nationals in certain execu-
tive and managerial positions.42
The passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)43
also supports this narrower interpretation of article VIII. Section
1101(a)(15)(E) of the INA sets forth circumstances under which an
alien can enter the United States pursuant to an FCN treaty.44 The
Sixth Circuit interprets this section to require that:
[b]efore a nonimmigrant alien can be issued a treaty trader visa, the State De-
partment is required to certify that he will be 'engaged in duties of a supervi-
41. 1953 Hearings, supra note 37, at 9; see also Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, United States-Israel, art. VIII, para. 1-2, 5 U.S.T. 550,
558, T.I.A.S. No. 2948 (incorporating the "regardless of nationality" language directly
into article VIII).
42. The limited amount of legislative history supporting any position regarding the
scope of article VIII has led to a great deal of reliance on passages that were probably
never intended to carry such weight. The weight given to concern over percentile re-
strictions is a good example. If relied upon as the sole purpose of article VIII, it is pos-
sible to conclude that only laws limiting the hiring of noncitizens would fall within the
purview of that clause. However, if the concern over percentile restrictions is properly
taken as only one of many reasons behind article VIII, then it becomes clear that
nonpercentage restrictions impacting the ability of the foreign corporation to engage
executive personnel of their choice do not automatically apply. The comments relating
to the concern over percentile restrictions support the conclusion that the complete
exemption was intended to apply only when the foreign corporation wanted to "en-
gage" one of its own citizens. This is the activity to which percentile restrictions pose a
threat. See generally Note, Japanese Companies, supra note 5; Note, Japanese Em-
ployers, supra note 5.
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982 & Supp. III 1983).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E) (1982); see Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363,
368-69 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that article VII of the Greek treaty, similar to article
VIII of the Japanese treaty, allowed Greek corporations to discriminate in favor of
Greek citizens only).
sory or executive character or if he is or will be employed in a minor capacity,
he has the specific qualifications that will make his services essential to the
efficient operation of the employer's enterprise and will not be employed
solely in an unskilled manual capacity.'4 5
Accordingly, foreign corporations attempting to hire their own citi-
zens to fill executive positions in the United States are "subject to
the supervision and control of the State Department." 46 When the
INA and article VIII are read in conjunction, there is strong evidence
that the intended exemption was for citizens of the foreign corpora-
tion's country only. Furthermore, by having control and supervision
over the ability of these foreign citizens to enter the United States,
the fear expressed in Sumitomo that such an exception would emas-
culate United States labor laws is greatly reduced.47
Thus, there is substantial evidence that applying the obvious mean-
ing to the words "of their choice" might well effect a result inconsis-
tent with the intent or expectations of the signatories. 48 Focusing on
the character of article VIII, its relation to United States labor stan-
dards, and the policy behind FCN treaties in general reinforces this
position.
IV. THE NONCONTINGENT CHARACTER OF ARTICLE VIII
Herman Walker,49 in articulating the scope of various FCN treaty
provisions, recognized three mutually exclusive standards: (1) a stan-
dard contingent on "most favored nation treatment"; (2) a standard
contingent upon "national treatment"; and (3) noncontingent stan-"
dards.50 Most favored nation treatment is defined as treatment as
45. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 369. A visa will issue to an alien if the purpose of his entry
into the United States is:
(i) solely to carry on substantial trade, principally between the United States
and the foreign state of which he is a national; or (ii) solely to develop and
direct the operations of an enterprise in which he has invested, or of an enter-
prise in which he is actively in the process of investing, a substantial amount
of capital.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E) (1982). However, an alien will only be eligibie for a "treaty
trader" visa under an FCN treaty, if he:
establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he qualifies under
the provisions of section [1]101(a)(15)(E)(i) of the Act and that: (1) He intends
to depart from the United States upon the termination of his status; and (2) if
he is employed by a foreign person or organization having the nationality of
the treaty country which is engaged in substantial trade as contemplated by
section [1]101(a)(15)(E)(i), he will be engaged in duties of a supervisory or ex-
ecutive character ....
22 C.F.R. § 41.40(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
46. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 369.
47. The court felt that "no evidence supports Sumitomo's broad interpretation [of
article VIII] which carried to its logical conclusion, would immunize a party not only
from Title VII but also, from ... [all United States labor standards]." Sumitomo, 638
F.2d at 559.
48. See supra notes 30-32 and acqompanying text.
49. See supra note 17.
50. Walker, supra note 17, at 811.
[Vol. 16: 383, 1989] Friendship, Commerce, & Navigation Treaties
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
favorable as that enjoyed by the citizens of any foreign nation,5 '
while national treatment amounts to the same treatment afforded to
native citizens.52 However, noncontingent standards are "[a]bsolute
rules ... intended to protect vital rights and privileges of foreign na-
tionals in any situation, whether or not a host government provided
the same rights to the indigenous population."53
The characterization of article VIII into any one of these three cat-
egories will have a significant impact on its proper scope. The court
in Sumitomo appeared to place article VIII in the national treatment
category.5 4 Such a classification favors limiting the scope of article
VIII to the treatment which is enjoyed by United States corporations.
In other words, foreign corporations would be subject to United
States labor and civil rights laws to the same degree as domestic cor-
porations. This interpretation, however, seems to render the "of
their choice" language meaningless. By interpreting article VIII to
fall into the noncontingent class, the court in Itoh recognized that
"article VIII(1)'s 'of their choice' provision was intended, not to guar-
antee national treatment, but to create an absolute rule permitting
foreign nationals to control their overseas investments. '"5 5 The court
also noted that other provisions which were intended to be accorded
"national treatment" were all prefaced with the following phrase:
"[N]ationals of either Party shall be accorded national treatment. '56
Article VIII contains no such express limitation, thus lending support
to the court's conclusion. 57
Walker also interprets article VIII(1) as an example of a noncon-
tingent standard.58 According article VIII greater than national
51. See Walker, supra note 28, at 236.
52. See Walker, supra note 17, at 810-11.
53. Itoh, 643 F.2d at 360 (citing Walker, supra note 17, at 823).
54. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 559. The court stated that "the clause 'of their choice'
was . . . intended, in furtherance of the overall purpose of the Treaty, to facilitate a
party's employment of its own nationals to the extent necessary to insure its opera-
tional success in the host country .... M One source has supported this view of
article VIII by arguing that a broad interpretation of this provision would exempt for-
eign corporations from all American labor laws and that this "would be a major depar-
ture from the Treaty's basic purpose of assuring equal, 'national' treatment." Note,
Japanese Employers, supra note 5, at 950-51.
55. Itoh, 643 F.2d at 360.
56. Id. at 361.
57. Id.
58. Walker, supra note 28, at 234 n.15. In regard to noncontingent provisions,
Walker describes them as:
rule-making in independent terms, without reference to the treatment given
to others. Although non-contingent standards, because of their implication of
definiteness might at first blush appear to provide the avenue to provisions of
treatment is not only consistent with the "of their choice" language,
but also with the overriding goal of the FCN treaties to assure inves-
tors that they will be able to maintain control over their foreign
investments.
Besides allowing greater than national treatment, the noncontin-
gent character of article VIII is of a more concrete nature than either
of the two contingent standards. Walker notes that, as opposed to
noncontingent standards, "[c]ontingent standards . . .carry built-in
automatic equalization and adjustment mechanisms." 59 This is be-
cause both of the contingent standards are tied to a "determinable
pole of reference" 6 0 (i.e., the treatment of others or of one's own citi-
zens). However, noncontingent standards are limited only by their
own terms pursuant to their "absolute rule nature."6 1 Thus, noncon-
tingent standards like article VIII should not be amenable to varying
interpretations based upon the ever-changing United States political
and social climate. This is a critical point to remember when analyz-
ing article VIII's conflict with subsequently enacted labor and civil
rights legislation.
V. ARTICLE VIII's CONFLICT WITH UNITED STATES LABOR AND
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
Assuming that article VIII was intended to accord foreign corpora-
tions a certain degree of control over their executive personnel, it
must be reconciled with existing United States labor and civil rights
laws. The courts have primarily concerned themselves with the con-
maximum positiveness and efficacy, the utility of the approach is in fact quite
limited. The scope of these treaties is such that, to be manageable, their con-
tent of rules must be stated essentially in a summary or simple fashion. A
summary contingent rule has definiteness, because its content is measured
against a determinable pole of reference. But a summary non-contingent rule
may often be considerably less than so, when reduced to language of agree-
ment between nations of unlike faculties of appreciation and different cul-
tural and juridic backgrounds. The need for avoiding rigidity-freezing
today's wisdom into tomorrow's folly-can not, in our international tower of
Babel be served by the same semantics that have so successfully kept the
American Constitution abreast of the times; raisonnable is not the "reason-
able" of American jurisprudence, nor is our 'due process of law' faithfully
translatable into a foreign language.
Walker, supra note 17, at 811-12 (emphasis in original).
59. Walker, supra note 17, at 812.
60. See supra note 58.
61. This is supported by and explains Walker's belief that:
the non-contingent standard generally finds its best utility in a few contexts
in which, no contingent standard being adequate, some recognizable body of
applicable international law and terms of art has nevertheless evolved; it is
also used at times faute de mieux, or to suggest a general guidepost of behav-
ior en principe, or to solve some special problem.
Walker, supra note 17, at 812 (footnote omitted). The language "engage executive per-
sonnel of their choice" appears to fit nicely into the category of a general guidepost of
"behavior en principe."
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flict between article VIII and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.62 Ti-
tle VII prohibits hiring policies that have the purpose or effect of
discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.63
Article VIII, however, specifically allows foreign corporations to
discriminate on the basis of national citizenship. While Title VII does
not appear to specifically bar discrimination based on citizenship,6 4 it
would not require innovative pleading skills to turn discrimination
based upon citizenship into a national origin, racial, or sexual dis-
crimination claim. 65 Furthermore, such suits could be brought on re-
verse discrimination grounds.66 Thus, even if the courts adopt the
view that article VIII grants an exception for the engagement of the
foreign corporation's own citizens, a conflict with Title VII exists.
The court in Sumitomo resolved this conflict in favor of Title
VII.67 The court felt that Title VII was consistent with the language
and purpose of article VIII because "Title VII, construed in the light
of the Treaty, would not preclude the company from employing Japa-
nese nationals in positions where such employment is reasonably
necessary to the successful operation of its business."6 8 In other
words, the foreign corporation had to satisfy the BFOQ exception.69
The court also held that requiring a foreign corporation to establish
BFOQ status would not "impose undue burdens on foreign employ-
ers."70 Further, the court was concerned that any broad interpreta-
tion of article VIII would "immunize" the foreign corporation from
other important labor laws such as those covering the employment of
62. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
63. Id.
64. In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 89-91 (1973), the Court held that by
"national origin," Congress had not intended to refer to distinctions based on
citizenship.
65. For example, in Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1679 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the plaintiff objected to the foreign corporation's hiring and pro-
motion practices as violating Title VII by claiming that these practices were discrimi-
natory against "non-Japanese national origin employees." The court, after deciding in
plaintiff's favor, mentioned in a footnote that plaintiff might merely be stating that
defendant corporation was discriminating in favor of Japanese citizens, and may have
failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 1684 n.3. Subjecting foreign corporations to liti-
gation of this sort was clearly not intended by the FCN treaty signatories.
66. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976) (hold-
ing Title VII to prohibit racial discrimination against whites in private employment on
the same terms as it prohibits discrimination against non-whites).
67. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
68. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 559.
69. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
70. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 559.
children.71
The approach taken by Sumitomo is misguided for several reasons.
Initially, the BFOQ exception was intended to be, and has been, in-
terpreted narrowly. 72 Under the Sumitomo approach "[t]he bfoq
would become the equivalent of the 'of their choice' provision...."73
Expanding the BFOQ to allow the engagement of one's own citizens
in executive positions would result in the BFOQ having a greater
scope than anticipated by Congress.74
Secondly, Sumitomo's conclusion requiring the foreign corporation
to establish BFOQ status every time it desires to engage a national in
an executive position seems to create an unreasonable burden. The
"of their choice" language was not included in the treaty to subject
both parties to a case by case determination and review of executive
employment decisions.75 In fact, it seems that article VIII was
drafted for the very purpose of avoiding such excessive litigation.
Furthermore, "[t]he main difficulty with such an attempt to pro-
vide an exemption from civil rights laws by use of the [BFOQ] ... is
that the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties appear to
provide broader exemptions than merely to the civil rights provi-
sions.'76 Both the Sumitomo and Itoh courts noted that the article
VIII exemption being requested exceeded civil rights coverage and
extended to other laws that do not have provisions similar to the
BFOQ.77 As Joseph Fleming78 noted:
[t]here is no similar exemption in many of the other federal labor and dis-
crimination laws; if the pending case is resolved by virtue of the unique at-
tempt to reconcile a treaty conflict with a statutory conflict by relying on an
exemption in the statute, the treaty question will still create problems with re-
gard to other labor and discrimination laws.7 9
Thus, while the BFOQ exception may provide a marginally accepta-
ble escape from Title VII liability, it offers no protection from other
71. Id.
72. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
73. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384, 391
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
74. "To expand the bfoq exception in an attempt to reconcile Title VII to the
Treaty language will only result in 'lip service' to Title VII while widening and weak-
ening the heretofore narrow construction given to the bfoq exception." Id.
75. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
76. Fleming, Can an International Treaty to Encourage Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation Invalidate Application of U.S. Labor and Employment Discrimina-
tion Laws?, 56 FLA. B. J. 456, 458 (1982) (emphasis added).
77. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 559; Itoh, 643 F.2d at 362. "For example, it would be
difficult to find a similar means of reconciling the conflict between the treaty provi-
sions qnd the application of the Labor Management Relations Act [29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1947)] which provides rights to labor organizations." Fleming, supra note 76, at 459.
78. Fleming is a partner of the law firm of Fleming and Huck in Miami, Florida.
He has served as chairman of the Labor Law Committee and the Environmental and
Land Use Section of the Florida Bar. Fleming, supra note 76, at 457.
79. Id. at 460 n.60 (emphasis added).
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labor regulations that would equally impair the ability of foreign cor-
porations to maintain control over their foreign investments by limit-
ing their power to engage executive personnel "of their choice."
It should also be noted that by providing only foreign corporations
with the BFOQ exception to escape Title VII liability, article VIII is
being accorded only "national treatment" standards8 O because all lo-
cally incorporated firms are also entitled to the privilege of the
BFOQ exception. Such an approach is inconsistent with the noncon-
tingent nature of article VIII, which was intended to provide greater
than national treatment.8 ' Although the Supreme Court reversed
Sumitomo on grounds other than article VIII,82 it noted that "[t]he
only significant advantage branches may have over subsidiaries is
that conferred by Article VIII(1)."83 The BFOQ approach treats
branches and subsidiaries incorporated in the United States (and not
entitled to FCN protection) alike, thus negating the Supreme Court's
view of the role of article VIII.
The Second Circuit's concern for the integrity of non-Title VII la-
bor standards also appears overstated. Article VIII would exempt
only executives, accountants, attorneys, agents, specialists, and tech-
nical experts.8 4 "Since these employees would be of executive, pro-
fessional, managerial or administrative categories, they would be
exempt from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ... and would not be covered employees under the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act .. .. ".85 Concern over child labor laws also
seems misplaced since article VIII deals only with top level employ-
ees whose services are necessary to ensure the operational success of
the foreign corporation.8 6
80. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 7.
83. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189 (emphasis added).
84. ROK Treaty, supra note 3, at 2223.
85. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384, 390
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
86. As the court in MacNamara noted:
[E]mployees at this level are in a position to make their own bargains or at
least to discover before applying for or accepting a position with a foreign cor-
poration that it is doing business in this country pursuant to a Treaty and to
ascertain the conditions of employment. If it were within a court's preroga-
tive to set policy, which it is not, it would seem that the balance would tip in
favor of construing the treaty language plainly and not contorting it to protect
what is likely a relatively small number of persons who knowingly assume es-
sential positions which establish or administer the policy and solely advance
the financial interests of the employing foreign entity.
Id. at 390-91.
If the courts adopt the approach that article VIII applies only when
citizens of the foreign corporation's country are engaged in executive
positions, the concerns of destroying the integrity of United States la-
bor regulations will be even more reduced. Under this approach,
United States citizens could not be subjected to labor practices incon-
sistent with these regulations. For example, if a Korean corporation
hires a child protected by United States child labor laws, the article
VIII exemption would be available only if the child was a Korean cit-
izen. Children that are United States citizens are not covered by the
exemption. This is consistent with both the goal of encouraging for-
eign investment by way of article VIII and the intended scope of
American labor regulations, which arguably were not meant to cover
foreign citizens working in foreign corporations.
Because of the paramount importance of Title VII, some courts are
still unwilling to provide an exemption despite the express language
of article VIII. After conceding that the rationale of the Itoh deci-
sion was compelling, the court in Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern,
Inc.,87 held in favor of the plaintiff ,and Title VII: "There is . . . a
firm commitment to uphold and support the progress of Title VII in
its attempt to wipe out all forms of invidious discrimination, and this
court perceives no compelling reason to put a chink in that armor."88
This rationale raises the issue of the relationship between treaty pro-
visions and subsequently enacted federal legislation; doctrines of
treaty interpretation assist in determining their relative priority.8 9
VI. TREATY INTERPRETATION
Since a majority of FCN treaties were entered into prior to the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act, the relative priority of Title VII and arti-
cle VIII turns on the appropriate rules of treaty interpretation. The
cases seem to follow two inconsistent sets of rules which largely con-
tributed to the disparity between the Sumitomo and Itoh decisions.
In Whitney v. Robertson,90 the Supreme Court noted that when
resolving conflicts between treaties and federal laws, a well estab-
lished principle requires that the court first attempt to reconcile the
87. 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1686 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (American subsidiary of
a Danish corporation discharged plaintiff because he was an older American citizen
and not a Danish citizen).
88. Id at 1689. The opinion stated that "[t]his court does concede that the Fifth
Circuit's rationale is quite compelling as there is a strong argument for the theory that
American businessmen like foreign businessmen sought provisions . . . 'to ensure so
that the . .. businessman's investment in the host country would remain within his
control.'" Id. (citing Itoh, 643 F.2d at 361).
89. Itoh, 643 F.2d at 361; Linsky, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1689.
90. 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (plaintiff merchants claiming that the treaty with the Do-
minican Republic entitled them to import various goods duty-free consistent with a
statute allowing duty-free imports from Hawaii).
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two.91 This is apparently the approach taken by the court in
Sumitomo. However, the conflict between article VIII and Title VII
is not adequately reconciled by way of the BFOQ exception.92 If the
conflict is irreconcilable, as in Sumitomo, the question becomes if
and when subsequent federal legislation supersedes prior treaty
provisions.
The court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co., follows a line of cases that adhere to an "implied repeal" doc-
trine.93 This doctrine emerges from the Robertson decision94 holding
that when a treaty and a federal statute directly conflict with one an-
other, the one most recently enacted controls.95 Based on this ap-
proach, Title VII simply overrides article VIII via the implied repeal
doctrine.
However, the Itoh court followed a separate line of cases, which ad-
here to the general rule that "subsequent federal legislation will in-
validate treaty obligations if the congressional intent to do so is
clearly expressed."96 This approach was also followed in MacNamara
v. Korean Air Lines.97 The Supreme Court has expressed concern
over interfering in the "delicate field of international relations" ab-
sent the clearly expressed intention of Congress.98
Under this approach, the Itoh court found no language in Title VII
indicating Congress's intent to repeal article VIII. The court further
91. Id. at 194.
92. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
93. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (E.D.
Pa. 1980). The court first noted that "a self-executing treaty provision is 'equivalent to
an act of the legislature' in its legal effect ...... I& (citing Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)). The court then inferred that "principles governing the implied
repeal of statutes by subsequent statutes [are] to apply with equal force to subsequent
treaty provisions." Id.
94. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
95. Robertson, 124 U.S. at 194.
96. Itoh, 643 F.2d at 362 (emphasis added) (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963)).
97. 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384, 391 (E.D. Pa. 1987). In MacNamara, the
court found that "[ijn the absence of the clear intent of Congress to disavow the
Treaty, it is appropriate to consider whether there is any reconciliation between the
Treaty language and Title VII." Id. The court then noted the Second Circuit BFOQ
reconciliation and discounted it for the reasons stated above. Id; see supra notes 67-83
and accompanying text.
98. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (discussing
whether the Labor Management Relations Act applied to United States labor disputes
involving foreign vessels and foreign crews); see also Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). "Absent explicit stat-
utory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of
treaty rights .. Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
noted that despite the high priority of employment discrimination
laws, "resolving doubts in favor of Title VII would go beyond the ju-
dicial sphere of interpretation. In the absence of congressional gui-
dance, we decline to abrogate the American government's solemn
undertaking with respect to a foreign nation."99
The diversity of case law reflects the difficulty of reconciling two
entirely different types of authority, both of which are considered to
be the "supreme Law of the Land."100 However, the nature of FCN
treaties favors a construction consistent with that adopted in Itoh.
This is supported by the fact that FCN treaties are "negotiated on a
bilateral, rather than a multilateral, basis."101
FCN treaties are "normally concluded for an initial period of ten
years certain and indefinitely thereafter, unless and until terminated
upon the giving of one year's formal notice."0 2 The stability, dura-
bility, and breadth of FCN treaties "demand rules framed in terms of
principles that remain valid regardless of an unpredictable fu-
ture."103 Thus, the bilateral nature of the treaty makes a unilateral
"implied repeal" of a very important provision most unnatural.
For instance, the United States reacted unfavorably when Korea
tried to unilaterally repeal a treaty provision through subsequent leg-
islation. In 1963, the Republic of Korea passed the "Newspaper,
Communication, Etc. Registration Act,"104 which prohibited foreign
nations and foreign organizations from becoming publishers or edi-
tors of foreign periodicals. The United States Commercial Attache in
Korea asked whether any consideration was given to the possibility
of conflicts with the FCN treaty, but was assured that none ex-
isted.105 Despite these assurances that the FCN treaty would remain
intact despite subsequent legislation, the State Department for-
warded a telegram which read:
Embassy should express hope that appropriate administrative action be taken.
to protect these rights and request ROKG [Korea] consider appropriate
changes be made to conform law to Treaty guarantees. Koreans might be re-
minded that a law of this nature is scarcely conducive to favorable foreign in-
vestment climate which [is] presumably one of [the] objectives [of the]
99. Itoh, 643 F.2d at 362.
100. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
101. Walker, supra note 28, at 240 (emphasis added).
102. Walker, supra note 17, at 809 (footnote omitted).
103. Id. (emphasis added). Walker also suggests that "the traditional bilateral ap-
proach offers the opportunity, in the context of a general regulation of relations com-
mencing with the idea of friendship,' to accomplish step-by-step such progress as is
now possible in building international rules of law for the protection of persons and
their legitimate interests abroad." Id. at 824.
104. Korean Law No. 551, July 1, 1960 (unofficial translation found in 545 KOREA-
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS, PUBLIC LAWS AS PROMULGATED).
105. Incoming telegram from American Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, to the De-
partment of State (Jan. 1, 1965).
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ROKG.106
Acceding to United States demands, the Korean government held
that articles VII and VIII of the FCN treaty preempted domestic law
under the doctrine of "Lex specialis deroget generali," for the treaty
was applicable only to the people of the signatory countries, while
the domestic law was applicable to all foreign persons.107 This ap-
proach is faithful to the bilateral nature of the treaty. Furthermore,
it would be unaccommodating to the primary FCN goal of foreign in-
vestment to argue for the adoption of Lex specialis deroget generali
when control over United States foreign investments is in jeopardy,
and then to argue that domestic law is free to supersede FCN provi-
sions to the detriment of foreign investors.
Thus, at a very minimum,108 it seems that in order for a subse-
quent federal statute to repeal a bilateral treaty provision, a clear in-
tent to do so must be stated. This is consistent with the view recently
taken by the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Frank-
lin Mint Corp.,109 wherein the Court noted that "[t]here is... a firm
and obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit re-
peal of a treaty in ambiguous congressional action."' 10
VII. ANALYSIS OF OTHER FCN TREATIES
Thus far, the focus has been on article VIII of the Japanese and
Korean FCN treaties. However, a look at similar provisions in other
FCN treaties is useful to determine the proper scope of article VIII.
In 1960, three years after the Korean treaty and seven years after
the Japanese treaty, the United States ratified an FCN treaty with
Pakistan."' Article VIII of this treaty provides that "[n]ationals and
companies of either Party shall be permitted, in accordance with the
106. Outgoing telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the American Embassy in
Seoul, South Korea (Jan. 22, 1965).
107. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (No. 82-5085) (Affidavit of I.S. Kim) (translating the applicable section from
the leading Korean international law textbook-H.K. LEE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1980)).
108. An argument could be made that a subsequent federal statute should never
unilaterally repeal a bilateral treaty provision. Since the FCN treaties are revocable
upon one year's notice, then timely revocation is the proper way of unilaterally repeal-
ing treaty provisions. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
109. 466 U.S. 243 (1984) (plaintiff claiming that TWA's liability limit of $9.07 per
pound of baggage was in violation of the Warsaw Convention).
110. Id at 252 (emphasis added).
111. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Feb. 12, 1961, United States-Pakistan, art.
VIII, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683.
applicable laws, to engage, within the territories of the other Party
... executive personnel.., of their choice."" 2 This language clearly
subjects the foreign corporation to the host country's applicable labor
standards for executive employment decisions.
The absence of the phrase "in accordance with the applicable laws"
in the Japanese and Korean treaties is significant.n 3 It could easily
have been inserted had the parties so intended. As the Supreme
Court in Geofroy v. Riggs" 4 noted, treaties "are contracts between
independent nations, in their construction words are to be taken in
their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of nations,
and not in any artificial or special sense impressed upon them by lo-
cal law, unless such restricted sense is clearly intended."115 Thus,
the two versions of article VIII, being substantially different, deserve
different interpretations consistent with the "ordinary meaning" of
their terms.1 1 6
Furthermore, when the government of Uruguay indicated an un-
willingness to accept a similar provision in their FCN treaty, there
was a strong negative reaction from the United States negotiators.
Uruguay proposed that, with regard to the foreign corporations' abil-
ity to select executive personnel, "discrimination against [host coun-
try] nationals shall be avoided, and without prejudice to laws
designed to protect their employment."" 7 The United States negoti-
ators felt that such an "amendment would seriously weaken rights
which this paragraph seeks to safeguard... ,"118 The final document
retained the rights of foreign corporations to employ executive per-
112. Id at 114 (emphasis added).
113. The approach taken by the court in Sumitomo would render this discrepancy
in the language of the treaties meaningless by subjecting Japanese and Korean corpo-
rations to American labor standards despite the clear language to the contrary. See
Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 558-59.
114. 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (resolving the question of whether a citizen of France,
whose property rights are protected under a treaty with France, can inherit land from
a United States citizen in the District of Columbia).
115. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
116. This view is consistent with the established principle of treaty construction re-
quiring a broad interpretation to protect the rights created, not a restrictive construc-
tion against those rights. See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
In MacNamara, the court acknowledged the limiting language in the Pakistan
Treaty and noted:
(t]here is no limiting language in the Korean treaty, though clearly there
could have been, if desired. Hence, it is reasonable to infer that the United
States' intent and understanding was that, unless modified, 'freedom of choice'
was unconditional as to essential personnel. It is further reasonable to assume
that Korea must have given that language its plain meaning.
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384, 387 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
117. Airgram No. 262 from the U.S. Department of State to the U.S. Embassy,
Montevideo, Uruguay (Nov. 10, 1949).
118. Id. Further, the United States State Department was of the impression that
the proposal would create "serious difficulties." Id.
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sonnel of their choice, regardless of nationality, in accordance with
United States' desires.1 19
The negotiations with Uruguay indicate the United States' intent
that an article VIII provision be included to allow American investors
to control their overseas investments by exempting them from for-
eign labor regulations in the hiring of American citizens -in executive
positions. The Uruguay treaty contains the first such provision writ-
ten into an FCN treaty.120 It is reasonable to conclude that as the
amount of foreign investment in the United States increased, leading
to more United States citizens being employed by foreign firms oper-
ating in the United States, the desirability of a provision like article
VIII may have decreased. The treaty with Pakistan may be seen as
representative of. this change. However, such a change in circum-
stances should not be allowed to alter the plain meaning of a noncon-
tingent standard in a bilateral treaty.
VIII. FCN TREATY CHARACTERISTICS AND THE DESIRE TO
MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
In determining the intended scope of any particular FCN provision,
it is essential to look at the characteristics and policies of the treaty
as a whole. Through an understanding of the objectives of treaty ne-
gotiations, a more accurate and consistent interpretation of article
VIII is possible. In describing the nature of the FCN agreement, Her-
man Walker noted:
[A]lthough 'friendship' is attributed an honored place in the title . .. these
treaties are not political in character. Rather, they are fundamentally eco-
nomic and legal. Moreover, though 'commerce' and 'navigation' complete the
title and accurately describe part of their content, their concern nowadays is
only secondarily with foreign trade and shipping. They are 'commercial' in
the broadest sense of that term.1 2 1
Not only are FCN treaties predominantly commercial in nature,
they are also primarily concerned with the encouragement and pro-
tection of foreign investment:122
Treaties for investment purposes deal with the basic legal conditions which in-
119. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Economic Development, United States-
Uruguay, S. EXEC. Doc., 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1949).
120. Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50
AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 386 (1956).
121. Walker, supra note 17, at 806 (emphasis added).
122. "The principal vehicle advocated by the United States Government... to deal
by agreement with the ground rules affecting investment is the bilateral treaty of
friendship, commerce, and navigation . Walker, supra note 28, at 230 (emphasis
added).
fluence the degree to which potential investors are willing to venture their
capital in undertakings in a foreign land. They aim, on a joint consensual ba-
sis, to establish or confirm in the potential host country a governmental policy
of equity and hospitality to the foreign investor.1 2 3
These primary goals of commercial investment, encompassing both
foreign investment in the United States and United States invest-
ment in foreign nations, are of significant importance when address-
ing the intended scope of article VIII. These treaties were not
drafted for the primary purpose of protecting American labor from
potential discriminatory hiring practices of foreign firms, and their
provisions should be read accordingly.124
Another characteristic of FCN treaties to consider in determining
the scope of article VIII is their bilateral nature. Prior to the ratifica-
tion of the Japanese treaty, Senator Hickenlooper made a significant
point in noting that:
[W]hen the United States gives a right or a privilege to an alien to carry on
activities in this country, the United States in turn obtains similar rights for
American citizens abroad. I emphasize this point because it is essential that
we not view the conventions simply as documents which give aliens limited
rights in this country. In fact, since there are many more Americans doing
business abroad than there are aliens doing business in this country, Ameri-
cans, as measured in either numbers or in volume of business, get more ad-
vantages abroad than we accord advantages here to aliens. 12 5
Thus, an important concern related to any restrictive interpreta-
tion of article VIII is the likely retaliation by foreign signatories
against United States investments abroad, an interest that, as Senator
Hickenlooper notes, is substantially greater than those small conces-
sions we gave up in return.. Consequently, due to the bilateral nature
of the treaty, any restrictive interpretation of article VIII will virtu-
ally undermine one of a primary United States FCN interest-to fa-
cilitate American private sector investment in foreign nations.126
123. Id. Walker also felt that "following World War I ... [FCN] treaties were
designed especially to promote international trade .... With the consequent decrease
of emphasis on the FCN treaty's role in international trade, the instrument lay ready
to hand following World War II to be retooled to fit the newly-crystallized investment
need." Id. at 231 (emphasis added). "It meant ... a shift in orientation and internal
balance, with the refinement, building up, and supplementing of familiar features es-
pecially pertinent to investor requirements." Id.
124. Even the court in Sumitomo recognized the investment concerns leading to
the drafting of the Japanese treaty. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 554.
The entire program of negotiating treaties of friendship, commerce and navi-
gation was expressly authorized by Congress in the Mutual Security Act of
1952, § 7(k), which directed the State Department to 'accelerate a program of
negotiating treaties of commerce and trade ... to encourage and facilitate the
flow of private investment to countries participating in programs under this
Act'.... Thus the postwar treaties were intended primarily to facilitate
American private-sector investment in foreign nations.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
125. 99 CONG. REc. 9313 (1953).
126. See Zenith, 494 F. Supp. at 1267.
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The bilateral nature of the treaty also requires that United States
courts provide some deference to the interpretation given article VIII
by the foreign signatories. While the Sumitomo case was before the
Supreme Court, 127 several foreign groups filed briefs expressing their
concern over the Second Circuit's interpretation of article VIII. The
Japan External Trade Organization argued that "endorsement of the
decision of the Second Circuit will tend to discourage Japanese direct
investment .... The court's decision tends to frustrate the intention
of the FCN treaty 'by undercutting the ability of Japanese investors
to control the key personnel who manage their investments in the
United States.' "128 Japan's Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry took the position that "[t]he ability of Japanese investors to
dispatch executive employees from Japan to manage and control
their overseas subsidiaries is of great importance and is indeed a basic
prerequisite to the successful management of their overseas business
activities."'129 Thus, the view of the foreign signatories is consistent
with a complete exemption from the host country's laws.
This discussion points out that when looking at the "four corners"
of the treaty, it is reasonable to conclude that Itoh was correct in
holding that the intent of the signatories with respect to article VIII
was exactly as ±hey wrote it; namely, that "[c]ompanies have a right
to decide which executives and technicians will manage their invest-
ment in the host country, without regard to host country laws."'130
This absolute exemption, however, can be refined and narrowed by
changing the focus of analysis from the overall policy concerns of the
treaty as a whole, to the more specific purposes associated with arti-
cle VIII. It is this more specific analysis which leads to the conclu-
sion that a complete exemption from host country laws was actually
intended to apply only when the foreign corporation was engaging
one of its own citizens in executive or top managerial positions.
Article VIII, and its right to free choice of executive personnel,
seeks to ensure that a foreign businessman's investment in the host
country will remain under his own control.131 However, it appears
that this interest should extend only as far as granting foreign inves-
127. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
128. Decision in Sumitomo Case Will Influence Foreign Investment, Supreme
Court Told, INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY, Mar. 3, 1982, at 518.
129. Brief of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry at 6, Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
130. Itoh, 643 F.2d at 361.
131. See Commercial Treaties-Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
with Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Germany and Japan: Hearings
tors the capability of engaging their own citizens in control positions.
No reasonable justification exists for assuming that the signatories
were concerned with an unfettered right to engage the host country's
citizens in any manner they saw fit. Such an assumption is wholly
inconsistent with the general purpose behind article VIII-keeping
management and control in the hands of the foreign investor.
Although legislative history is sparse in this area, there is sufficient
evidence suggesting that the "of their choice" language was intended
to be limited in this manner.13 2 Complementary "Treaty Trader"
provisions found in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952
further supports this position.1 33 By narrowing the broad exemption
adopted by the court in Itoh (which would have granted immunity re-
gardless of the citizenship of the employee in question), the risk of
emasculating United States civil rights and labor laws is reduced; si-
multaneously, the commercial and investment nature of the treaties
is recognized, together with adherance to the plain meaning of the
provision, as the Second Circuit in Sumitomo failed to do.
IX. CONCLUSION
The "of their choice" language of article VIII is clear on its face.
Yet the nature of treaties is inherently complex, both in terms of in-
terpreting the language of the treaty as well as resolving conflicts
with subsequent federal legislation. However, the "of their choice"
language was inserted into these heavily negotiated international
agreements to protect a specific right. That the provision was meant
merely to allow the foreign corporation to be subject to the host
country's labor standards is not only contrary to article VIII's plain
meaning, but is in direct conflict with the treaty's overriding goal of
encouraging foreign investment.
When negotiating the Korean FCN treaty, the Committee on For-
eign Relations noted: "The obligation of this treaty is to protect the
personal security, rights and property of Americans in Korea and to
facilitate their travel and business activities. The treaty emphasizes
measures which will promote private investment by the United
States in Korea."i 3 4
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
3, 6-9 (1953).
132. See Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363, 367-68 (6th Cir. 1984). The court
in Wickes, while interpreting article XII of the Greek FCN treaty (substantially simi-
lar to article VIII of the Japanese and Korean treaties), concluded that "(t]he legisla-
tive history of the Greek Treaty contains substantial evidence that Article XII was
intended to be a narrow privilege to employ Greek citizens for certain high level posi-
tions, not a wholesale immunity from compliance with labor laws prohibiting other
forms of employment discrimination." Id. at 365 (emphasis in original).
133. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
134. S. EXEC. REP. No. 5, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1957) (emphasis added).
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This comment reveals both the treaty's investment orientation as
well as its bilateral nature. In treaties designed to encourage invest-
ment, subjecting the foreign corporation's engagement of employees
in control level positions to the host country's labor standards is
anomalous. Under a bilateral treaty, it is foolish to presume that if
the United States unilaterally narrows article VIII, reciprocal meas-
ures will not be taken in those countries where United States corpo-
rations have vital investments. Further, the labor laws of these
foreign nations may be much more severe than our own.
The intent behind article VIII reveals that the signatories were pri-
marily concerned with maintaining management and control over
their foreign investments, not with the impact the limited exemption
to the host country's labor laws would have on the host country's citi-
zens. As Senator Hickenlooper remarked:
[i]f a country could in any manner limit the right of a foreign enterprise to
engage or terminate the employment of executive personnel of its choice, it
would severely undercut the ability of an enterprise to control and manage its
investment--an ability which the United States sought to secure.1 3 5
Control over one's investment is adequately maintained by granting a
complete exemption to the placement of citizens of the foreign corpo-
ration's country in executive and other important central positions.
Any broader interpretation, though possible due to the plain meaning
of the language of article VIII, would effect "a result inconsistent
with the intent or expectations of its signatories." 3 6
Doctrines of treaty interpretation, though inconsistent, are ade-
quate to support the conclusion that subsequent federal legislation
will not impliedly override previously established bilateral treaty
provisions. Legislation expressing an intent to do so, however, is
much more consistent with the bilateral nature of FCN treaties. Ac-
cordingly, legislation such as the Civil Rights Act will not void the
exemption carved out by article VIII.
Thus, in adhering to the overriding objectives of FCN treaties and
to the more specific objectives sought by article VIII, the "of their
choice" language should be interpreted to grant a complete exemp-
tion from the host country's laws where a foreign corporation is at-
tempting to engage one of its own citizens in an executive position in
their foreign office. The benefits which American overseas invest-
135. 99 CONG. REC. 9312 (1953) (emphasis added).
136. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
ments will enjoy greatly outweigh the cost of granting this narrow
exception to United States labor standards.
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